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Abstract
Recent advances in robotics leads us to consider, on the one hand, the
notion of a kernel, a set of stable algorithms that drive developmental
dynamics and, on the other hand, variable body envelopes that change
over time. This division reverses the classic notion of a fixed body on
which different software can be applied to consider a fixed software that
can be applied to different kinds of embodiment. Thus, it becomes possible
to study how a particular embodiment shapes developmental trajectories
in specific ways. It also leads us to a novel view of the development
of skills, from sensorimotor dexterity to abstract thought, based on the
notion of a fluid body in continuous redefinition.
1 Incorporation
Our skin is not the limit of our body. When we interact with tools and technical
devices, our body extends its boundaries, changes shape. The stick, the hammer,
the pen, the racket, the sword extend our hand and become, after some training,
integral parts of our body envelope. Without thinking about it, we bend a bit
more when we wear a hat and change the way we walk when we wear special
shoes. This is also true for more complex devices. We are the car that we are
driving. It took us many painful hours of training to handle it the right way. At
the beginning it was an external body element, reacting in unpredictable ways.
But once we got used to the dynamics of the machine, the car became like our
second skin. We are used to its space occupation, the time necessary to slow
down. Driving becomes as natural as walking, an unconscious experience.
Our body envelope is extensible, stretchable, constantly changing. If we
want to fix a nail on wall, we will first pick a hammer. At this stage, the
tool is abstracted from the environment. A few second later, when we pick the
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hammer, we temporally extend our body envelope to include the tool in our
hand. It disappears from our attention focus as a direct extension of our hand.
It is incorporated. Once our goal has been reached, we put back the hammer
and the tool becomes again an external object, ready to be used, but separated.
This is the fundamental and misunderstood process of incorporation.
ABSTRACTED INCORPORATED
ERROR IN PREDICTION
Figure 1: Illustration of the incorporation process. Objects can either be ab-
stracted from the environment or incorporated as extension of our body. The
process of incorporation takes time. Surprise or failure causes an incorporated
objet to be abstracted again. When one learns to use an object, error in pre-
diction corresponds to disincorporation of the object. The fewer the errors the
more the object is incorporated.
The first time we use a hammer, we fail to fail to control it perfectly. Ev-
ery time we fail to predict where the hammer will be, the tool becomes again
abstracted, back in our attention focus. It takes time until we can successfully
predict the consequences of our action with this ”extended” hand and it is only
when prediction errors are very low that the object is fully incorporated (figure
2
1).
Before picking a hammer, we must first choose it among the other tools
abstracted from our toolbox. Once picked, new objects, nails, become relevant
for the pursuit of our goal. We don’t think anymore of our extended hand, we
focus on these new abstracted objects. In general, incorporation is a recursive
process. At a given state of incorporation, certain objects are abstracted from
the environment and become affordants. When one of these objects starts to
be controlled and therefore incorporated, our attentional space changes and
new objects get abstracted (figure 2). As we will later argue, this recursivity
is a fundamental component that permits not only hierarchical compositional
behaviour but also higher-level cognitive processes.
Figure 2: Incorporation is a recursive process. At a given state of incorporation,
certain objects are abstracted from the environment and become affordants.
When one of these objects start to be controlled and therefore incorporated,
new objects get abstracted
There is a long tradition of research that discusses the notion of body
schema, body map, body image as if it was some stable notion that the child
needs to discover or model. Such approach to the body does not give a good
account of the flexibility of our embodiment. The relevance of considering
the body not as a fixed, determined entity but as a fluid perceptually chang-
ing space has been argued by several philosophers [Merleau-Ponty, 1945], psy-
chologists [Schilder, 1935], ethnographers [Warnier, 1999] and neuroscientists
[Head and Holmes, 1911]. However, we are still far from having a precise model
of the process of incorporation and its relationship with attention, memory and
learning. In this paper we will argue that recent experiments with robots permit
to progress in this direction.
The argument developed in this article is the following. Since the 1950s,
robots were essentially seen as fixed bodies in which different programs could
be plugged, like the software and hardware parts of a computer. This dualism
has led to a prejudicial divergence between artificial intelligence researchers
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building intelligent programs and roboticists building sophisticated bodies. In
the last 1980s, a handful of researchers tried to escape from what appeared to
be a technological dead-end and pushed forward a reunited view of intelligence,
under the name of embodied artificial intelligence or new A.I. [Brooks, 1991,
Steels and Brooks, 1994, Pfeifer and Scheier, 1999]. They argued that physical
bodies and control systems should be intrinsically linked, like two sides of the
same coin. The return to the design of complete agents undoubtedly led to
some successes, notably for locomotion, sensorimotor learning and navigation
in unknown complex environments. However, if such kind of holistic approaches
proved to be efficient for designing complex adapted behavior, they were not
sufficient to articulate a clear view of developmental processes. For instance,
in just a few months, children learn to crawl, stand, walk, jump, hop, run,
etc. As they learn these new skills in a continuous incremental manner, their
sensorimotor space changes, permitting them to investigate novel domains of
exploration. This is even clearer with the use of tools or the acquisition of
communication skills. This has led researchers in developmental and epigenetic
robotics to present models in which an agent is essentially constituted on the one
hand of a kernel, a set of stable processes that drive developmental dynamics
and, on the other hand, of variable body envelopes that change over time. This
new view reverses the classic notion of a fixed body on which different software
can be applied to consider a fixed software that can be applied to different kinds
of embodiment, potentially changing over time. The rest of the paper gives a
more detailed account of this important conceptual evolution.
2 The divided body
The Flute Player automaton built by the French engineer Jacques de Vaucanson
in the 18th century could play up to twelve different tunes. Unlike most of the
machines of that period which were conceived in a holistic manner, i.e. built as
complete integrated systems, this automaton introduces a separation between
stable body mechanics and programmable process for animation. Improving on
such kind of mechanism, the Writer from Pierre and Henri-Louis Jaquet-Droz
was equipped with forty ”cams” controlling the movement of the automata’s
hand. With such a system, the same body could perform different sequences of
independently programmed movements. These kinds of systems continuously
improved in the following years taking various shapes, wax cylinders, punch-
cards used for instance in machines meant to produce various fabric designs,
progressively creating each time a larger independency between the body me-
chanics and the animation process.
Near the middle of the 20th century, with the advent of the digital com-
puter, physical bodies and animation processes seemed definitively separated.
The automaton, now named robot, was conceived as a physical body equipped
with sensor and actuator controlled by a computer program, abstract digital de-
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scription of its behavior. With such a separation it was natural to have various
kinds of software ”applied” to the same robotic body.
Two complementary fields emerged. On the one hand, research in artificial
intelligence focused on designing algorithms for classifying data, prediction se-
quences and taking decision autonomously. On the other hand, robotic engineers
were busy creating new sensors and actuators, thus expanding the boundaries
of the ”world” in which robots could perceive and act.
As one could have guessed, these two disciplines diverged. Many AI re-
searchers stopped considering embodiment as an important part of their re-
search. They tended to prefer focussing their effort on building complex mod-
els of human cognitive behavior, concentrating on tasks like medical diagno-
sis, mathematical proof of theorems or strategic board games. These algo-
rithms were supporting a disembodied view of intelligence consisting essentially
in complex symbol manipulation [Haugeland, 1985]. Cognitive psychology re-
searchers used these new symbolic models to support the hypothesis that such
kind of information processing processes were giving more relevant account of
human behavior than the behaviorist theories very influential in the US at
that time. Progressively, the cognitivist and computational views, stipulat-
ing that thinking can be equated to symbolic computing, took grounds (see
[Churchland and Sejnowski, 1996, Fodor, 1999] for a review). The body was
forgotten, irremediably separated from the mechanism of intelligence.
Symmetrically, as one entire field of research explores the promises of intel-
ligence without bodies, another one develops bodies with not much intelligence.
The first industrial robots are installed in predictable, carefully arranged envi-
ronments. In workshops, they perform precise, calibrated, standardized move-
ments. Control theory made many important advances on how to control such
complex devices. Unfortunately, as soon as one tried to adapt these machines
to less constrained environment, changing or unknown in advance, the behavior
of such robots seemed very difficult to program.
Between the 1950s and the 1980s, the gap between the builders of robotic
bodies and the researcher trying to model ”intelligence” has some direct con-
sequences on the performances of the machines produced. The AI algorithms,
designed to manipulate predefined unambiguous symbols show clearly their in-
adequacy when it comes to deal with the complexity and the unpredictability
of the real world. Consider for instance the problem of programming the walk-
ing behavior of a four-legged robot using a classical AI algorithm. The set of
joints of a robotic body are not a set of abstract symbols but rather a complex
system that can easily end up being in out of equilibrium positions especially
if it is made of rigid parts, like most robots are. The type of ground and the
degrees of friction have a direct influence on the behavior of the machine. With
a symbolic AI approach, but also with many approaches in control theory, it
is important that the system is equipped with precise model of the robot body
but also on the environment in which the robot evolves. It many cases this is
just impossible. Viewed from this angle, walking on four legs can reveal itself
5
to be a harder problem than demonstrating mathematical theorems.
3 The reunited body
To go out of this dead-end, a new school of thought emerged at the end of
the 1980s, with the work of researchers like Rodney Brooks, Luc Steels and
Rolf Pfeifer. The so-called embodied artificial intelligence, or new AI, strongly
criticized the disembodied and symbolic approach of the ”classical” artificial
intelligence, claiming that intelligence could not be considered without reference
to the body and the environment [Pfeifer and Scheier, 1999]. Rodney Brooks
added that bodies and environments are impossible to model and that therefore
research should not try to build models of external reality but on the contrary
concentrate on direct situated interaction: “the world is its own best model”
[Brooks, 1999, Steels, 1994].
This change of perspective introduced a renewal of robotic experiments and
in someway a return to conception and experimentation methods that were
characteristics of robotics before the advent of the digital computer. Grey Wal-
ter’s cybernetic ”tortoises” built in 1948 are taken as canonical example of
what a good conception is, integrating seamlessly the physical design of the
machine to the targeted behavior. These entirely analogical robots were ca-
pable of complex behavior, without the need of any internal ”representation”
[Grey Walter, 1953].Their design was taking into account that they were physi-
cal machines, on which many kinds of ”forces” had an influence, from gravity to
frictions and that perception itself was primarily the result of their own move-
ment and behavior (a concept later known as ”enaction” [Varela et al., 1991]).
The nature and positioning of their sensors enabled them to solve complex tasks,
like returning to their charging station, without the need to make any kinds of
complex “reasoning”.
Inspired by von Uexkull’s writings [von Uexkull, 1909], research of the new
AI defined the behavior of their robot taking into account their “Umwelts: the
very nature and structure of their body immersed them in a specific ecological
niche where certain stimuli are meaningful and others not. This research was
also supported by the reappraisal of a non-dualistic philosophical trend which in
the tradition of Merleau-Ponty views cognition as being situated and embodied
in the world [Merleau-Ponty, 1942, Merleau-Ponty, 1945, Varela et al., 1991].
To try to convince the cognitivists to view intelligence only as a form of so-
phisticated computation, researchers in embodied AI tried to define the kind of
morphological computation realized by the body itself [Pfeifer and Bongard, 2007].To
solve a problem like four-legged walking, it is easier and more efficient to build
a body with the right intrinsic physical dynamics instead of building a more
complex control system. One can replace the rigid members and powerful mo-
tors of the robot by a systems of elastic actuators inspired by the muscle-tendon
dichotomy that is typical of the anatomy of quadruped animals. With such a
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body, one just needs a simple control system producing a periodic movement on
each leg to obtain a nice elegant and adapted walking behavior. Once put on a
given ground the robot stabilizes itself after a few steps and converges towards
its “natural” gait. With such a system, the walking speed can not be arbi-
trary defined but corresponds instead to attractors of this dynamical system.
Only an important perturbation can enable the robot to leave its natural walk-
ing gait and enter another attractor corresponding for instance to ”trotting”
[Pfeifer and Bongard, 2007].
Thus, in an attempt to suppress the gap inherited from the post-war field
division, embodied artificial intelligence emphasized the crucial importance of
the body and illustrated its role for the elaboration of complex behavior: body
morphological structure and animation processes must be thought as a coherent
whole.
4 Stable kernels
In the beginning of the 1990s, robotic experiments from the new AI perspective
focused essentially on reenacting insect adaptive behavior, examples strategi-
cally far from the classical AI programs playing chess. In the following years,
some researchers tried to extend this embodied approach to build robots ca-
pable of learning like young children do. The idea what not to address one
particular step in children development (like learning how to walk or how to
talk), but to capture the open-ended, versatile, nature of children learning. In
just a few months children incrementally learn to control their body, to ma-
nipulate objects, to interact with peers and caregivers. They acquire everyday
novel complex skills that open them to new kinds of perception and actions.
How could a machine ever do something similar? The objective of children-like
general learning capabilities was not new as it was already clearly articulated in
one of Turing’s founding article of artificial intelligence [Turing, 1950]. However,
the sensorimotor perspective developed by the embodied approach gave to this
challenge a novel dimension.
In asking how a machine could learn in an open-ended manner, researchers in
epigenetic or developmental robotics [Lungarella et al., 2003, Kaplan and Oudeyer, 2006]
partially challenged the basis of the embodied artificial intelligence approach
and introduced a methodological shift. The importance of the body was still
central as the focus was on developing sensorimotor skills intrinsically linked
with a specific morphology and the structure of a given environment. However,
while following an holistic approach, it seemed logical to identify inside a robotic
system, a process independent of any particular body, ecological niche or task.
Indeed, by definition, a mechanism that could drive the learning of an open-
ended set of skills, cannot be specific to a particular behavior, environment or
body. It must be general and disembodied.
Thus, the just reunited body must again be divided. But the division is
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not the one inherited from the punch-cards and the digital computer, the soft-
ware/hardware gap. In this new methodological dualism, the objective is to
separate (1) a potentially changing body envelope corresponding to a sensori-
motor space and (2) a kernel, defined as a set of general and stable processes ca-
pable of controlling any specific embodied interface. By differentiating a generic
process of incorporation and fluid body envelopes, the most recent advances in
epigenetic/developmental robotics permit to consider the body from a new point
of view. Contrary to the traditional body schemata, grounded in anatomical
reality, body envelopes are ephemeral spaces associated with a particular task
or skill. Contrary to easily changeable animation programs used in robotics,
we now consider a stable kernel, acting as an engine driving developmental
processes. It is not the body that stays and the programs that change. It is
precisely the contrary: the program stays, the embodiment changes.
Several kinds of kernels can be envisioned. Some of them lead to open devel-
opmental trajectories, others don’t. Let’s imagine a control room equipped with
a set of measurement devices, a panel of control buttons, and most importantly,
no labels on any of these devices. Imagine now an operator trying to guess how
the whole system works despite the absence of labels. One possible strategy con-
sists in randomly pushing buttons and observing the kind of signals displayed
on the measurement devices. However, finding blindly correlation between these
inputs and outputs could be very hard. For the operator a better strategy is to
identify the contexts in which he progresses in his understanding of the effects
of certain buttons and to explore further the corresponding actions.
It is possible to construct an algorithm that drives such kind of smart ex-
ploration. Given a set of input and output channels, the algorithm will try to
construct a predictive model of the effect of the input on the output, given its
history of past interactions with the system. Instead of trying random con-
figuration, the algorithm detects situations in which its predictions progress
maximally and chooses the input signal in order to optimize its own progress.
Following this principle, the algorithm avoids the subspaces where the outputs
are too unpredictable or on the contrary too predictable in order to focus on
the actions that are most likely to make it progress (figure 3). We call these
zones: “progress niches”. The use of such an algorithm results in an organized
exploration of an unknown space, starting with the simplest subspaces to pro-
gressively explore zones more difficult to model. The term “kernel” is relevant
for several reasons to describe the behavior of this algorithm. It is a central
process, stable, unaffected by the peripheral embodied spaces. It is also the
origin and the starting point of all the observed behavior.
Details of one version of this progress-driven kernel can be found in [Oudeyer et al., 2007].
However many variant of such kind of intrinsic motivation systems have been or
are currently being explored (see [Oudeyer and Kaplan, 2007] for a taxonomy).
One of the first computational system exploring progress-driven exploration
was described by Schmidhuber in 1991 [Schmidhuber, 1991]. He articulated
the idea that in order to learn efficiently a machine should try to reduce pre-
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time spent in each sensorimotor context 
based on the principle of maximizing error reduction
errors in prediction
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Figure 3: Confronted with four sensorimotor contexts characterized by different
learning profiles, the exploration strategy of a progress-driven kernel consists
in avoiding situations already predictable (context 4) or too difficult to predict
(context 1), in order to focus first on the context with the fastest learning curve
(context 3) and eventually, when the latter starts to reach a “plateau” to switch
to the second most promising learning situation (context 2).
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diction error instead of maximizing or minimizing it. More recently, different
types of intrinsic motivation systems were explored, mostly in software simula-
tions [Huang and Weng, 2002, Marshall et al., 2004, Steels, 2004]. Technically,
such control systems can be viewed as particular types of reinforcement learning
architectures [Sutton and Barto, 1998], where rewards are not provided exter-
nally by the experimenter but self-generated by the machine itself. The term
“intrinsically motivated reinforcement learning” has been used by Barto in this
context [Barto et al., 2004]. Interestingly, the mechanisms developed in these
papers also show strong similarities with mechanisms developed in the field of
statistics, where it is called “optimal experiment design” [Fedorov, 1972].
From a larger perspective, it should be noted that Artificial Intelligence
has a long tradition for trying to build generic, universal, open-ended, meta-
learning algorithms. Almost since its beginning, certain A.I. researchers have
tried to build programs that can solve many different problems. In 1957, Her-
bert Simon and Allen Newell created the General Problem Solver (GPS) that
aimed at solving any formalized symbolic problem, like strategic games, theo-
rems proofs, geometric problems, etc. It was probably the first implemented
program which separated its knowledge about problems and its strategy on how
to solve them [Newell et al., 1959]. More recently, theoretical so-called optimal
architectures have been explored. Several optimal but difficult to implement
systems (with existing computing architectures) have been recently described
like the AIXI universal learning algorithms [Hutter, 2005] or the Goedel Ma-
chines [Schmidhuber, 2006]. What appears when you look back at this history
of research attempts towards universal learning algorithm is that Artificial In-
telligence is not so much about solving problems but about framing problems in
the right way so that they can be solved in a general manner.
Coming back to our walking case study, let us now consider an experiment
where a progress-driven kernel controls the movement of the different motors.
For each motor, it chooses the period, the phase and the amplitude of a sinu-
soidal signal. The prediction system tries to predict the effect of the different
set of parameters in the way the image captured by a camera placed on the
robot’s head is modified. This indirectly reflects the movement of its torso. At
each iteration the kernel produces the values for the next parameter set in order
to maximize the reduction of the prediction error (figure 4).
When one starts an experiment like this one, several sets of parameters are
explored for a few minutes. The robot legs wobble in an apparently disorganized
manner. Most of these attempts have very predictable effects: the robot just
doesn’t move. Errors in prediction stay at a minimal level: these situation
are not interesting for the kernel. By chance, after thirty minutes or so, one
movement leads the robots to make a slight move, in most cases a step backward.
This new situation results first in an increase of the error in prediction but, as
the robot experiences similar movements again, this error tends to decrease: the
kernel has discovered a “progress niche”.
Then the robot will start exploring different ways to move backwards. Dur-
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Figure 4: A robot can learn to walk just by exploring smartly a sensorimotor
space. In the experiment. a progress-driven kernel controls the movement of the
different motors of a four-legged robot. For each motor, it chooses the period,
the phase and the amplitude of a sinusoidal signal. The prediction system tries
to predict the effect of the different set of parameters in the way the image
captured by a camera placed on the robot’s head is modified. This indirectly
reflects the movement of its torso. At each iteration the kernel produces the
values for the next parameter set in order to maximize the reduction of the
prediction error.
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ing this exploration, it is likely that it discovers that certain modification of
the parameters could lead to some sort of rotation movement, at least from
an external observer’s point of view. This is a new set of progress niches that
the robot will learn to exploit when the skills for walking backwards will be
essentially mastered.
In most experiments, it takes typically three hours for the kernel to find
several subsets of parameters resulting in moving forward, backwards, sideways
and to turn left and right. At no time in the process the robot was given the ob-
jective of learning to walk. Guided by the principle of maximizing the reduction
of error in prediction, the robot ends up developing versatile locomotion skills.
Actually, this versatility is the result of the unspecific nature of the kernel. A
robot artificially motivated to go towards a specific object may not have learnt
to walk backwards or to spin.
The fact that walking backwards revealed itself to be a parameter subset
easier to discover was not easy to foresee. Given the morphological physical
structure of the robot and the kind of ground the robot was placed on during
the experiments, the walking backward movement happened to be the first to
be discovered. To know whether this progress niche is actually an attractor for
most developmental trajectories, it is necessary to set up a bench of experimental
trials, changing systematically the initial conditions, including the morphology
of the robot itself. With such an experimental approach it becomes possible to
study the developmental consequences of a physical modification of the body.
A longer leg or a more flexible back can change importantly the structure of
the progress niches and therefore the trajectory explored by the kernel. From a
methodological point of view, the body becomes an experimental variable.
These robotic experiments naturally lead to novel questions addressed at
other fields, including neurosciences (Can we identify the neural circuits that
act as a kernel ? [Kaplan and Oudeyer, 2007a]), developmental psychology (Can
we reinterpret the developmental sequences of young children as progress niches
? [Kaplan and Oudeyer, 2007b]) or in linguistics (Can we reconsider the debate
on innateness in the language learning by reconsidering the role of the body in
this process ?[Kaplan et al., 2007]).
5 Fluid body envelopes
A simple way to change the body envelope of a robot is to equipped it with a
tool. Figure 5 shows how the body of four-legged robot can be simply extended
by a helmet that plays the role of a prosthetic finger.With this simple extension
the robot can now push buttons, press on hard surfaces, even switch on or off
other devices. This is a new space to explore.
Figure 6 shows the same idea with a pen holder. With this simple extension,
the robot can now leave traces and use the environment as an external memory.
A drawing is the temporal integration on a paper of a sequence of gestures. This
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Figure 5: A helmet-finger extension. Design : ECAL / Stephane Barbier-Bouvet
Photo : ECAL / Milo Keller
simple pen holder opens a whole new space of exploration where the machine can
learn to predict the relationship between a sequence of actions and particular
kinds of representations. Such kind of anticipation is likely to be a fundamental
milestone on the road towards higher-level cognition [Steels, 2003].
Figure 7 presents a small scooter adapted to the morphology of the robot.
Learning how to move with this device is not very different form learning how
to walk. Like in all the other cases, the progress-driven kernel discussed in the
previous section can be applied [Kaplan et al., 2006]. The body changes but
the program stays the same.
The progress-driven kernel does only give a partial understanding of the
general process of incorporation. We illustrated how it could act on a single
space, a single body envelope, like the parameter space resulting in versatile
walking skills, but we have not shown how it could be used to shift between them.
Incorporation as we described in our introduction involves complex sequences of
body envelopes transformation. It involves recursive and hierarchical processes.
Typically, once a robot would have learnt how to control its body to walk, it
should be able to use these newly discovered walking primitives as basic elements
for performing exploration of new spaces. A walking robot will certainly discover
new objects, new environment for learning. Let’s take for instance the case
of the graspable blanket of figure 8. This blanket is equipped with a special
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Figure 6: A pen holder extension. ECAL / Meynet Bndicte, Burgisser Olivier,
Xavier Rui,Wildi Sbastien et Reymond Simeon Photo : ECAL / Milo Keller
Figure 7: A scooter. Design : ECAL/ Clement Benoit and Moro Nicolas Photo
: ECAL/ Milo Keller
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handle adapted to the robot’s “mouth”. Learning to grasp the blanket is pretty
similar than learning to grasp the pen holder we just mentioned. Once the robot
would have learnt how to grasp this object, it could explore the specific space
corresponding to walking with a blanket. This compositional process could
continue endlessly.
Figure 8: A blanket with a special handle. Design : ECAL / Meynet Benedicte,
Burgisser Olivier, Xavier Rui,Wildi Sbastien et Reymond Simon Photo : ECAL
/ Milo Keller
Going from the exploration of a single envelope to a generic kernel capable of
easily switching between hierarchical envelops is a difficult issue. In particular,
it involves a mechanism permitting the formation of habits. The possibility of
implementing these different features in a single generic kernel remains to be
shown. However, several state of the art methods permit to move towards this
goal and envision how such a kernel could work. Multilayer recurrent neural net-
work architecture like the ones considered in [Tani and Nolfi, 1999, Tani, 2007]
or the option framework [Sutton et al., 1999] permit hierarchical learning where
chunks of behavior can be compiled and continuously adapted to be used later
on. When a sensorimotor trajectory becomes easily predictable it becomes im-
plicitly or explicitly associated with a dedicated expert predictor, responsible for
both recognizing this specific sensorimotor situation and automatically choosing
what do do. In other words, when a part of the sensorimotor space becomes
predictable it is no longer necessary to explore it at a fine grained level, a higher
level control is sufficient. In our walking example, routines for moving forward
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or backward, turning left or right could likewise become higher-level habits.
When this is the case, the progress-driven kernel could focus on other parts of
the space, assuming these basic behavior routines to be in place.
6 Concluding remarks
Paradoxically, robotics often associated with jerky movement of rigid mechan-
ical bodies, sets the stage, both theoretically and experimentally, for a new
conception of the embodiment process that views the experience of the body
as a fluid, constantly changing space. Viewing the body as an experimental
variable permits to approach the idea of a variable body.
More than a technology of animated body, robotics appears to be a science
and practice of the embodiment process. By extracting, on the one hand, the
concept of generic and stable kernel, origin of the movement and action, and, on
the other hand, the notion of changing body envelopes, robotics offers a novel
framework for considering deep and complex issues linked with development and
innateness. Indeed, what is development if not a succession of embodiment: not
only a body that changes physically but the discovery of novel embodied spaces.
Each new skill acquired changes the space to explore. Walking is one clear and
illustrative example. Once a child has learnt how to walk, he discovers a whole
new space of exploration. Therefore, viewing the body as fundamentally vari-
able permits to reconsider the phenomena of incorporation we introduced at
the beginning of this article. Through incorporation, the body extends tempo-
rally including objects, tools, musical interfaces or vehicles as novel envelopes
to explore with no fundamental differences with their biological counterpart
[Warnier, 1999, Clark, 2004].
By pushing further this notion of fluid body envelopes, couldn’t we consider
symbolic reasoning and abstract thought as merely special forms of body ex-
tension? Lakoff and Nunez suggested very convincingly that there is a direct
correspondence between sensorimotor manipulation and very abstract notion in
mathematics [Lakoff and Nunez, 2001]. Metaphorical transfer, one of most fun-
damental process to bootstrap higher-level of cognition, can be relevantly con-
sidered as a process of incorporation [Lakoff and Johnson, 1998]. Eventually,
couldn’t we consider linguistic communication itself as just one particular case
of embodied exploration [Oudeyer and Kaplan, 2006]? All these spaces could
be explored relevantly by progress-driven kernel like the one we presented.
Robots introduce both technological and philosophical questions. This has
always been the case [Kaplan, 2004, Kaplan, 2005]. Robotics offers now a frame-
work and an experimental methodology to start exploring issues very difficult to
address otherwise. Robots help us think about ourselves by difference. Study-
ing the development of robots with embodied spaces very different from our
own, is probably the most promising way to study the role of our body in our
own developmental processes. In that sense. robots are not models. They are
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physical thought experiments. That’s why they can permit to consider appar-
ently impossible splits, like the ones separating the body from the animation
processes or, more recently, the distinction between a stable kernel and fluid
body envelopes.
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